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Interview with Dr. Arturo
Valenzuela on the United States-
Cuba relationship
Isabelle Vagnoux
Interview conducted by Dr Isabelle Vagnoux on September 9, 2017, with many thanks to Dr. Arturo
Valenzuela for sharing his views with us.
Dr Arturo Valenzuela served in the State Department and the White House during
the Clinton Administration and was Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, during the Obama Administration from 2009-2011. A scholar, he
was Professor of Government and Director of the Council on Latin American Studies
at Duke University before joining the Georgetown Faculty in 1987 where he directed
the Center for Latin American Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
 Would you say that the Clinton Administration's policy toward Cuba, somewhat but not
totally reversed during the Bush Administration, paved the way for President Obama's Cuba
policy?
I joined the State Department at the beginning of the Clinton Administration where I
became responsible  for  the  diplomatic  relationship  between the  United  States  and
Mexico and also focused on thematic issues for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
including democracy, environment, and human rights. That is how I was drawn into the
discussions about Cuba policy. 
The  Clinton  Administration  strongly  opposed  the  Helms-Burton  Act  proposed  by
Senator Jesse Helms and Congressman Burton. I remember going up to the Congress to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives with a colleague of
mine who was in charge of the Caribbean to testify against Helms-Burton-- President
Clinton opposed Helms-Burton. The aim of the bill was to codify into law the Cuban
embargo, making it impossible for the president to change Cuba policy without an act
of Congress. By the way, the Republicans had regained a majority in both the Senate
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and the House in November 1994. Senator Dole was the majority leader in the Senate
and Newt Gingrich was the speaker in the House of Representatives. We made it clear
that the President is opposed to Helms-Burton bill, that the bill would not bring about
positive change in Cuba and, at the same time it would severely affect our allies because
several  articles  of  the  law,  particularly  articles  3  &  4,  placed  penalties  on  other
countries that might invest in Cuba. 
What happened? Just a few weeks later the Cuban government shot down the planes of
an  anti-Castro  group,  Brothers  to  the  Rescue,  that  flew  over  Cuba  distributing
antigovernment leaflets to promote anti-Castro sentiment on the island. The outcry in
the US was such that it became impossible for President Clinton to veto the Helms-
Burton law, because a two-thirds majority by Congress would have overridden the veto
anyway. Title 3 has rarely been invoked because the president can waive it... that’s the
article that allows companies or people who owned property in Cuba to sue in U.S.
courts companies “trafficked in those properties.” Title 4 is the one that takes away the
visas of executives of companies doing business in Cuba, for instance a Spanish tourism
company, or a French bank doing business in Cuba, or something like that. Executives
of these companies could be barred from entering the United States, where they might
have significant business interests. 
Why did the Cubans shoot down the plane and make it more difficult  for the first
democratic  president  in 12 years  to  attempt to change Cuba policy? An important
reality in US-Cuba relations is  that  there has always been a symbiotic  relationship
between the hardliners in Havana and the hardliners in Miami. In other words they
depended and depend on each other,  so that in a perverse way top Cuban officials
welcomed  the  Helms-Burton  law  that  codified  the  embargo.  They  feared  that  a
liberalization of US policy might lead to greater autonomy for the Cuban people, while
the hardliners in Miami felt that that any liberalization would simply strengthen the
regime. 
There was very little movement after that. When I went into the White House in 1999,
to head Latin America policy at the National Security Council in the last two years of
the  Clinton  administration,  the  President’s  National  Security  Adviser  asked  me  to
prepare a memorandum outlining the steps the United States could take to change
Cuba policy. My office proposed a series of liberalizing measures, which would have
taken steps in the direction of the measures that would later be adopted by President
Obama. But it became impossible to renew any initiative on Cuba policy because the
2000 presidential election was coming soon, Florida was critical to a democratic victory,
and Vice President Albert Gore was running for president.  Political  advisers at  the
White House argued against any changes in Cuba policy. As it turned out, Gore got more
votes than Bush, but lost Florida by a narrow margin, which might have been greater if
the Cuba reforms had been proposed. 
Bush was elected president and he went very much in the opposite direction. Under
U.S. law, if US citizens wanted to travel to Cuba, they would have to get permission to
go by obtaining a special license through the Department of the Treasury. For example,
at  Georgetown University  we had to  get  an educational  license  from the Office  of
Foreign Assets Control, in the department of the Treasury. Although we could send
students to study in Cuba in a program closely supervised by Georgetown, the Bush
administration  restricted  travel  much  more  severely  than  did  the  Clinton
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Administration,  including barring  Cuban Americans  from visiting  their  relatives  in
Cuba except for once in every three years, a severe limitation on many of the Cuban
Americans families. 
It should be underscored that a hard-liner position on Cuba had proponents in both
parties, primarily Cuban American politicians. On the Republican side this included the
Diaz  Balart  brothers,  and  Congresswoman Ileana  Ros  Lehtinen  (and  more  recently
Senator Marco Rubio)—all from Florida. And on the democratic side, Senator Robert
Menendez from the state of New Jersey. 
When Obama was elected, Cuba was not immediately a priority. President Obama faced
the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis of 2008, as well as the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the administration began to rethink Cuba policy. It was
then that I  rejoined government as  Assistant  Secretary,  the chief  diplomat for  the
Americas. What was the fundamental rationale that drove for the administration to
take-up  again  the  Clinton  efforts  to  change  Cuba  policy?  Very  simple--  that  the
embargo had failed, it had continued to isolate Cuban society, in many ways making it
more  difficult  for  Cuba  to  evolve  into  a  more  democratic  country  as  its  citizens
remained completely dependent on the state for everything, for jobs, for education, for
housing... even the vouchers to buy food, that kind of stuff... It was still a totalitarian
regime.
The premise was not  to partner with the Cuban government,  to permit  significant
commercial  investments or anything like that,  the whole rationale was to create a
stronger people to people engagement,  let  artists  go,  let  scientists  go,  let  religious
people go. As we worked on options, the idea was to see how we could eliminate the
individual  licenses  and  create  general  licenses,  which  US  citizens  could  use  in
establishing relationships with Cuban counterparts. This included in some commercial
areas—aimed at creating incentives to develop a Cuban the private sector. You could
have... l'Association des cosmétiques and you could partner with some organization in
the United States, maybe the barbers of South Florida, and they could help you set up
your little business, so you could cut hair, that sort of thing. 
And  remember,  even  before,  under  Helms-Burton,  the  United  States  could  export
agricultural  goods  and medicines  to  Cuba.  In  fact,  the  United States  is  the  largest
exporter  of  food  and  medicines  to  Cuba,  but  investments  in  other  areas  such  as
telecommunications  were  restricted.  Could  foreign  investments,  including  US
investments, help develop a telecommunication infrastructure that could in turn be
used by Cuban citizens to engage with the rest of the world? The rationale continued to
be how can we empower citizens, civil society, and by doing so help to encourage the
liberalization process. 
While we were deliberating internally things were changing in Cuba. The Damas de
Blanco movement seeking the liberalization of Cuban political  prisoners caught the
attention of the world. It was at that time, and since it is in the public record, I can talk
about it, that I was called by the Papal Nuncio in Washington and told that the Cuban
Cardinal was coming to town and wanted to see me in private. He began our meeting by
noting that for the first  time in the relationship between the government and the
Church in Cuba, the government had asked the Church for help--- rather than simply
trying to set down rules. That was in relationship to the Damas de Blanco matter, where
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the Church initiated a mediating role. He also noted “Castro wanted me to come and see
you... to note that he was open to a dialogue with the United States.” 
To my surprise, he also said "Nous aussi, nous avons des Jacobins and des Talibans",
"Acuerdate", "Remember, Raul also has his Jacobins and his Taliban.” Essentially, he
was  conveying  his  concern that  the  hardliners  in  Cuba  were  going  to  oppose  any
détente. In fact, I saw that first hand... I later had a private meeting with the Foreign
Minister of Cuba and he did not want to hear about any of the proposed steps the US
might want to take that could include taking Cuba off the terrorist list, encouraging
investment and seeking ways to cooperate—as the US did with Haiti in helping the
country after the earthquake. Instead, he insisted on recounting the long history of US
Cuba relations and the imperialist attacks on Cuba going back to José Marti's days. 
We had agreed to the meeting to discuss possible changes in the relationship, but also
because  the  Cuban  government  had  recently  detained  an  American  citizen  who
travelled  to  Cuba  to  engage  with  religious  groups,  supplying  them  with
communications equipment.  His detention would make it impossible for the Obama
Administration to move forward with changes to Cuba policy in his first term. 
I said, "look, why did you arrest Alan Gross, you're doing the same thing you did when
you shot down the Brothers to the Rescue, the reason why you took Gross is that you
really  don't  want  liberalization  to  take  place".  By  capturing  Gross,  I  think  the
hardliners  in  Cuba  were  essentially  sending  a  signal  that  they  didn't  want
liberalization, they didn't want things to change. You must change on our terms, which
are "lift the embargo but let's continue to control Cuban society", no democracy, and
no competitive elections, none of that stuff.
And there was also the Oswaldo Paya tragedy, as well; he had a lot of supporters.
Ironically the hardliners in Havana didn't like him at all because Oswaldo Paya kept
saying  that  change  could  come  within  the  framework  of  the  existing  Cuban
constitution. That was what the Varela project was all about, gathering signatures, so
that people could now hold better elections. The hardliners in Miami did not like that
because they thought he was too accommodating to the regime.
Despite that, in 2011, the Obama Administration did introduce some important changes
in Cuba policy in it first term, which paved the wave for the secret negotiations with
Cuba  that  took  place  when  the  President  was  reelected.  (I  left  the  Obama
Administration in August of 2011, to return to my duties at Georgetown.) In fact, one of
the key people involved in those negotiations was someone who had worked closely
with me when I was Assistant Secretary. I am referring to Ricardo Zuñiga, a career
foreign service officer who had been the acting director of the office of Cuban affairs
when I  was at  the State Department.  He had drafted ideas that  were presented to
Secretary Clinton and then to the White House for that were the bases of the first group
of changes that were implemented by the administration in the first term. 
Zuñiga  was  appointed  to  the  National  Security  Council  in  the  Second  Obama
Administration where  he  was  asked by  Ben Rhodes,  who was  the  Deputy  National
Security Advisor, to help negotiate directly with the Cubans, joining Rhodes in those
talks. I am convinced that one of the reasons the Cubans now expressed interest in the
conversations  and helped resolve  the  detention of  the  American in  Cuba,  was  the
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increasingly  critical  situation of  the  Cuban economy,  particularly  after  Venezuelan
subsidies began to decline. 
And one of  the things  that  are  interesting is  that  the Obama administration went
further  than  the  Cubans  expected,  insisting  that  diplomatic  relations  also  be
reestablished. But, the Cubans really did not want that, they just wanted the United
States to lift the embargo so that they could overcome their economic difficulties. They
were taken by surprise when the administration insisted, and at first, they opposed it
very  strongly,  relenting  when  the  Administration  made  clear  that  reestablishing
diplomatic relations was an important part of a possible agreement. Remember... that
many hardliners in Cuba continued and continue until today to oppose normalization...
they fear very much an independent, a more self-sufficient civil society because they
have controlled it so thoroughly all these years. 
 Did the opening, suddenly announced in December 2014, surprise you or did you think that
it was just the result of so many years of underground work? 
These things don't happen overnight. There's several explanations for why perhaps the
Cubans  were  more  willing  to  do  this,  one  of  them  was  the  overdependence  on
Venezuelan oil, and the continued weakness of the Cuban economy, and the awareness
that ... I didn't mean to suggest that I think that Raul Castro was somebody who wanted
to essentially have the credit of elections, but Raul Castro wanted perestroika, he didn't
want  glasnost,  he  wanted perestroika,  an  economic  opening  and not  necessarily  a
political opening.
The fear of course, is that for the hardliners, if there was perestroika there would be
too much of a pressure for them to have glasnost too, which is the debate, by the way,
that took place in Mexico as well, when the PRI began to liberalize the economy, the
pressure that Salinas was under was that you can’t just move towards free trade with
the US without necessarily thinking that there would also be pressure to hold more
competitive elections.
 Recently  a  press  release  by  Republicans  spoke  of  the  "  Cuban  nefarious  activities  in
Venezuela". How do you view a possible impact of current developments in Venezuela on
Cuba?
I think in some ways there was a strong codependence there. On the one hand, Chavez
welcomed the advice and the work of all the Cuban doctors in Venezuela, one of the key
exports of Cuba. They were very successful in helping the government build a strong
allegiance from some of the lowest sectors of society and that included health care.
Thanks to Cuban doctors, in exchange for oil. The Cuban economy essentially could
survive this very difficult period because of the subsidies they got from Venezuelan oil.
Petrocaribe  was  important  for  Cuba  at  the  time  when the  economy  was  really  in
trouble.  And of course,  the collapse of Venezuela has become very problematic for
Cuba. Some people don't understand why the Cubans seem to be supportive of Maduro
but I'm not quite sure they fully are... Actually I suspect there are a lot of differences of
opinions in Havana on how to handle the Venezuela crisis.
 How do you foresee the future of the opening between the United States and Cuba?
You know, there's no question that because of the direct intervention of people like
Rubio,  the  speech  that  Trump gave  in  Miami  and  then his  statements,  essentially
pointing to reinstating some of the measures that President Bush had taken was very
much motivated  by  Florida  politics.  Remember  that he  was  very,  very  critical  of
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President Trump's appointment of Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State; there was strong
influence from Cuban Americans on that decision too. 
Now, if you look at the changes, there's two things to underscore: so far, they have not
gone back to the very restrictive policies of the second Bush administration and it was
notable that President Trump did waive Title 3 (the president can waive it every 6
months), in part because of the criticism of European allies about the extraterritorial
reach  of  U.S.  legislation.  But  at  the  same  time  there's  a  lot  of  uncertainty  about
administration policy.  Its  hardline rhetoric  is  more apparent  than real  substantive
changes. And yet individuals and companies don't know what to do, should we invest in
Cuba,  what's  coming  next.  This  is  due  to  the  lack  of  clarity  on  the  part  of  the
Administration,  the  disorganization  in  the  White  House,  the  frequent  policy
contradictions, and the lack of leadership in some of the key agencies like the State
Department.
 When you  read  Human rights  organizations  reports,  they're  critical  of  the  condition  of
human  rights  in  Cuba,  it  seems  that  more  people  have  been  arrested,  precisely  since
December 2014, so do you think this fuels the opposition of those who criticize Obama's
policies and fuels President Trump's policies?
I  think there is  simply no question that  the Castro regime has been very hard on
dissidents in Cuba. The human rights advocates are correct in saying that this is a
regime that continues to bar free expression, bar activities ... they even go after artists
... but the question though is whether the previous policy of isolating Cuba, with the
embargo, had worked in terms of changing that dynamic? 
Quite the contrary, in fact, it made it much easier for the regime to go after.... in fact,
one of the things that is interesting about it is... when President Obama took these steps
and reestablished diplomatic relations and so on and then when artists and others in
Cuba began to express their views more freely, and they were arrested, there was much
more  criticism not  only  from the  United  States  but  also  from eventhe  left  in  Latin
America, that became very disillusioned with Cuba. They’ve lost some ground, I think,
particularly with the younger people.
So,  what  can be said to the human rights  people:  not  to  restore the same sort  of
draconian measures on Cuba, which in fact allowed the Cuban regime to be even more
successful in pushing back on human rights. And the Cuban regime is not necessarily
going to change its policy. In other words, if we ... Let's put it this way...in some ways,
the people to people strategy is a strategy to force the Cuban government to liberalize.
This is  not a situation where you ask this Cuban government,  "please liberalize or
otherwise we're not going to work with you". On the contrary, "look, we're going to
take some steps that will make it more difficult for you to continue with this regime ...
because we know that many of you don't want changes".
 How do you anticipate future developments after  Raul  Castro leaves the presidency in
February 2018?
Ironically,  I  do  agree  with  the  Cuban  Cardinal’s  statement  about  Castro. I  don't
necessarily see Raul Castro as representative of the hardest line sector of the Cuban
political system. Again, he wanted perestroika, without necessarily wanting glasnost.
However, with Castro out in the near future, I worry about some of the replacement
leaders who have reached positions of power under this regime and don’t have clear
incentives to change that. I'm not sure that in the short-term Raul Castro’s stepping
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from the stage is necessarily going to lead to significant liberalization, I think it is going
to take some time. A lot will depend on how the replacement people see the need for
transformation ... Let's put it this way, if you find more Gorbachevs or Jaruzelskis that
are prepared to work with some of the incipient democratic forces in Cuba, maybe
you'll see that. The international community, including the United States, should help
to encourage that process.
 So, it is a big question mark...
It is a question mark but the issue is, returning to the draconian policies of the past
would probably play in the hands of those hardliners who don't want change. So, I
would strongly argue for a continuation of policies of engagement and empowerment
of Cuban society.
 This sounds like a perfect conclusion. So many thanks for your time and for sharing your
memories and your insight with us.
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